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Abstract

This thesis examines the governmental changes in Spain from the beginning of Francisco
Franco’s dictatorship in 1936 until the end of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s first term as Prime
Minister in 2008 in order to determine the degree to which politics affects cultural change in
Spain, focusing on popular music. The first chapter deals with Franco’s regime and the laws that
controlled the country and the adoption of the southern Spanish traditions as the official Spanish
culture, repressing the individual characteristics of the other regions. Next, the second chapter
compares the transition from dictatorship to democracy aided by King Juan Carlos I and Prime
Ministers Adolfo Suárez and Felipe González to the evolution of the popular music, in particular
that produced by the cultural movement la movida madrileña. Lastly, the final chapter
concentrates on Spain’s modern democracy and its incorporation into the global community
thanks to the efforts of Prime Ministers José María Aznar and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The
music during this period reflects both Spain’s internationalization and the nationalistic feelings
that resurged for the first time since Franco. The conclusion of the analysis is that there is a
direct correlation between politics and popular music, regardless of the efforts that a government
makes to control the culture.
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Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to understand how the socio-political history of Spain impacted
its domestically produced popular music, particularly between 1936 and 2008. This time frame
restricts the research from the beginning of Francisco Franco’s regime to the end of José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero’s first term. By limiting myself to these years, I was able to compare the
effects of three different forms of rule, dictatorship, transitional government, and modern
democracy, on the evolution of popular music and eliminate historical events that are too recent
to be objectively analyzed. Originally I wanted concentrate mainly on the music, examining how
it is possible to see changes in the country through the transformation of the popular songs,
however this manner of analysis would have required a more thorough knowledge of Spanish
history, resulting in an eventual shift of focus from music to history.
Nonetheless, before starting it is important to have an understanding of popular culture.
Popular culture is a concept that is easily understood but extremely difficult to define. 1 One
interpretation suggests that popular culture is an “unauthorized culture,” meaning that it does not
have the backing of the powers in charge that confirm something as “art,” for example. 2 What is
identified as “popular” depends on the time and the people, and therefore can quickly change. It
differs from country to country, and even region to region. Outside influences affect the
development of popular culture as well, even though in some cases traditional styles remain
dominant. With the advent of mass popular culture, which did not exist during the 1930’s and
beginning of the 1940’s, 3 the starting point of this study, popular culture became commercialized
and therefore changed its nature. Suddenly consumer goods became a manner through which it
1

Parker, 147.
Parker, 165.
3
Jordan and Morgan-Tamosunas, “ Part I,”15.
2
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was possible to measure popular culture, 4 and mass marketing, such as advertising, altered the
mindsets of people. This shift created a new value system based on commercial development,
which affected various aspects of the private and public life. 5
Music is an important aspect of popular culture because it “…refines our sensibility, it
educates and cultivates the spirit.” 6 According to Carmen Ortiz in “Folklore and the Franco
Regime,”
…Popular culture, or certain elements of a more emotive or aesthetic kind (like music or
poetry), [can] also play a significant role in the pursuit of other objectives, such as
symbolizing or establishing bonds of cohesion or belonging for certain social groups and
the inculcation and socialization of beliefs, value systems, or norms of behavior. 7

Music plays a unique role in any culture because it has the ability to demonstrate a group of
people’s search for an identity and track their social changes through time. Music, therefore, is
an excellent tool to gauge the ever-changing politics in Spain starting in 1936.
Popular culture struggled to exist in Spain after the Civil War (July 18, 1936 to April 1,
1939) because the dictator and the military regime that he imposed actively reinforced hatreds,
divisions, and social fragmentation. In order for a popular culture to emerge, there must be a
sense of unity amongst the people, especially within a working class, and these feelings struggled
to encompass all of Spain. Furthermore, because Spain was isolated from much of the world for
a significant period of time, it transformed into a society in which the people became more
vulnerable and open to the wills of the authoritarian regimes, or a “mass society.” 8 Additionally,
until the beginning of Franco’s regime, Spain had felt very regional for so long, each region
having its own language, traditions, music, that creating a unified image of the country and thus
4

Mukerji and Schudson, 51.
Mukerji and Schudson, 52.
6
Ortiz, 491.
7
Ortiz, 483.
8
Mukerji and Schudson, 56.
5
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a common popular culture posed a challenge. 9 Adding all of the factors together, Spain becomes
a perfect case study for examining how the political changes are reflected on the popular music:
Initially there were no outside influences to complicate the development of the culture, the
people were directly affected by their government’s actions, and the strong regional traditions
allowed parallel tracts of popular culture to emerge, speaking to true feelings felt by every part of
the country even to this day.

9

Jordan and Morgan-Tamosunas, “Part 1,” 15.
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Chapter One: The Franco Regime

Francisco Franco, a middle class soldier, 10 was a general fighting against the Second
Republic of Spain in what came to be known as the Civil War when on October 1, 1936 the other
Nationalist generals elevated him to the position of Caudillo, or supreme commander and head
of state, 11 from which he controlled Spain until his death on November 20, 1975. 12
Born on December 4, 1892, the eventual dictator of Spain enrolled in the Military
Academy of Toledo as a teenager and rose quickly through its ranks. 13 During his formative
years, Franco began to believe that nationalism and patriotism came from the military, and the
military’s job was to protect and promote these feelings. He also developed a dislike of the
monarchy that ruled from 1876-1923, 14 as well as the Republicans that came into power on the
eve of the Civil War. 15
When Franco was given the power of Caudillo or generalísimo, the first phase of his
regime began. Within a matter of two years, Franco outlawed all political parties aside from his
own, headed the armed forces and government, and assumed the power of the only lawmaker in
the country. 16 The generalísimo created his own original government that completely eradicated
the one left from the Republic, and during his lifetime, Franco had twelve governments and 120
different ministers, most of whom he dismissed after only four or five years in their position. 17

10

Carr, ix.
Fusi, 19.
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Fusi, 170.
13
Fusi, 1.
14
Fusi, 5.
15
Fusi, 9.
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Arango, 64.
17
Fusi, 43.
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However through all of the political changes, one thing remained constant: Franco always
believed in patriotism, religion, unity, and order. 18
Based on the first decade alone, it seemed impossible that Franco’s regime would
survive. Throughout the 1940’s, Spain’s economy was an autarky, or a self-sufficient economy,
molded after Fascist Italy’s ‘national-syndicalist state’ economy. Franco had no economic
background 19 and did not notice the negative effects of some of his policies on Spain’s industry
and economy, 20 such as the 1939 Instituto Nacional de Colonización and the 1941 Instituto
Nacional de Industria, 21 until strikes and boycotts ignited around the country in 1951. 22 Not until
1960 did Franco start speaking in a more technical manner about the economy and claiming that
economic developments finally could happen in Spain because of the effects of the previous
Francoist political actions. In reality, the economic growth and development only occurred
because Franco created a system that was closer to the other Western capitalist countries,
something that he refused to even consider until the late 1950’s. 23
Despite the necessary changes that Franco made at home, his economy would have
collapsed if other nations had not intervened. At this point, Franco’s Spain had yet to be
acknowledged as a state by the United Nations, or even by other countries, because of Franco’s
violations to human rights and un-democratic tendencies. Consequently, Spain did not receive
resources or foreign aid, and the country continued to exist in the very rough state that it was left
in after the Civil War. Luckily for Spain, the United States entered the early stages of the Cold
War and needed to build air and naval bases in Europe, and Spain’s geographic location proved

18

Fusi, 45.
Fusi, 84.
20
Fusi, 89.
21
Fusi, 86.
22
Fusi, 87.
23
Fusi, 99-100.
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to be extremely valuable to the security of the United States. 24 Another attractive feature about
Spain to the United States was that Franco actively began expressing his disdain for communism
well before the Cold War, a rhetoric that continued for the rest of his life. 25 Thus, on August 1,
1950, Washington gave Madrid $65 million and signed for the rights to hold bases in the country
on September 26, 1953. 26 This deal proved to be momentous, because the world’s most powerful
democracy publicly acknowledged Franco’s Spain, 27 and made an even grander impact when
President Eisenhower visited Franco in Spain during December of 1959, a turning point in
Spain’s history. 28 By visiting Spain, the champion for democracy, capitalism, and freedom
openly supported Francoism, despite the fact that the government was neither democratic nor
capitalistic, nor did it provide freedom for its citizens. Furthermore, the United Nations accepted
Spain as a member in 1955, receiving international recognition for the first time since the state’s
formation in 1936. 29
At the time that Eisenhower visited, Spain was as close to being a totalitarian state as a
nation could be while allowing one group to exist outside of their control, the Catholic Church. 30
Franco revered the Church, and claimed it to be the moral compass of his country, 31 calling it a
‘Catholic monarchy.’ 32 The Church was exempt of many of Franco’s policies that affected the
rest of his people, such as the censorship laws of 1941. 33 The Vatican generally agreed with
Franco during his regime; the two even signed a concordat on August 27, 1953 34 to ensure that

24
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their relations remained positive, 35 which was vital for Spain because it signified that the
Catholic Church defended the regime, giving Franco even more legitimacy. 36 It soon became
evident that Spain could not be considered totalitarian if they coexisted with the Church in such a
symbiotic manner, so by 1946 Franco began to focus his speeches around his new opinion that
Spain was not a dictatorship, and was in fact an ‘organic democracy.’ This of course was not
correct because the people still did not have basic democratic rights, such as the right to political
associations, demonstrations, meetings, and expression, as well as the fact that his governing
body, Cortes, was not elected by the people, but appointed by the head of state, Franco. 37
In order to legitimize his state, whether it was a totalitarian regime or an “organic
democracy”’ Franco needed to construct a constitution. Just like all of his politics and decisions,
it took many years before the constitution was completed or any established institution existed, a
process which some have referred to as a “policy of inactivity.” 38 Franco’s constitution was
made up of the Fundamental Laws of the State (FLOS), seven laws constructed during Franco’s
regime and later combined into a constitution that dictated the Caudillo’s opinion of how the
country should function and what life should look like under his rule. 39
The first Fundamental Law of the Constitution, the Labor Law (Fuero del Trabajo), was
ratified on March 9, 1938. This law forbade strikes and labor unions, introduced job security,
regulated salaries, and had an overall tone that favored the employers. 40 Next, the Constitutive
Law of the Cortes (Ley Constitutiva de las Cortes, July 17, 1942) created the Parliament called
Cortes, made up of members who were indirectly elected or selected by Franco, who took the

35

Fusi, 78.
Fusi, 62.
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Fusi, 62-63.
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title of the chief legislature and the ability to annul any law. 41 The third Fundamental Law, titled
Fuero de los Españoles, or the Statue Law of the Spanish People, was implemented on July 17,
1945. This law served as a Bill of Rights for the people of Spain, and even though it did not
include democratic rights, it did limit the rights that could still be taken away if a situation
developed in which the right threatened Spain. 42 The fourth law, the Law of the Nation
Referendum (Ley del Referéndum Nacional) of October 22, 1945, gave the Head of State the
ability to consult the public (men and women over the age of 21) by means of a popular vote
during the drafting of new bills. 43
Continuing, on July 26, 1947, Franco and his government created the Law of Succession
in the Headship of State (Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado), which approved the
restoration of the monarchy and the ability of the Head of State to appoint his successor and
ratified all of the previous Fundamental Laws. 44 The Law on the Principles of the National
Movement (Ley de Principios del Movimiento) became the sixth Fundamental Law on May 17,
1958. This law deemed political parties outside of Franco’s illegal and created a justice system
for the country. 45 The last of the Fundamental Laws, January 10, 1967’s Organic Law of the
State (Ley Orgánica del Estado) solidified Franco’s political system, harmonized the
inconsistencies in some past Fundamental Laws, removed elements from the Laws that could be
labeled totalitarian, continued with the liberalization of Spain, installed direct elections of the
members of the Cortes by the heads of the families, and separated the head of the state and head
of the government. The most important component of this last law was that it bound the seven

41

FLOS, 95-107.
FLOS, 27-40.
43
FLOS, 121-124.
44
FLOS, 109-119.
45
FLOS, 19-25.
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separate laws into one constitution, or the Fundamental Laws of the State (Leyes Fundamentales
del Estado). 46
With a formal constitution in place, Francisco Franco’s next step was to choose a
successor. The generalísimo did not want Don Juan, the surviving son of the destined king
during the Second Republic, to become king after his death, because that would legitimize the
monarchy that reigned before the Civil War, not Franco’s creation. This meant that either Don
Juan had to sacrifice his birthrights or Franco had to ignore them. 47 Instead, on July 22, 1969
Franco selected Don Juan’s son, Prince Juan Carlos, to become the king and carry the traditions
of Francoism onwards past the dictator’s death, ruling alongside Franco’s Prime Minister Luis
Carrero Blanco. After much debate, Don Juan had no choice but to accept this decision because
Francoism could not have continued without his son. 48
As Franco’s regime turned its back to its former totalitarian tendencies and closer to a
democracy, more and more social conflicts emerged. Despite the Caudillo’s belief that his
people were happy and the majority supported him because they had never lived so well, this
was not the truth: 49 In fact, as his regime wore on, Franco gained more and more opponents. 50
One explanation for this trend is that the dictator’s policies progressed at such a slow pace that
he was not able to predict or keep up with the changes in society, and therefore had to choose
between making well over-due reforms or repression. 51 Around the same time, in the mid1960’s, Spaniards were still not economically up to the standards of the rest of Europe, and the
Spanish workers could not strike, bargain, form unions, or vote. 52 There had been social unrest
46
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and occasional strikes and protests earlier, but these events became more common during the
1960’s, the greatest opposition coming from the laborers, to whom Franco eventually granted
some demands but never let publicly unionize. 53
Nevertheless, workers were not the only group growing unhappy with Franco. Students
began to show their resentment in the universities and areas with stronger ties to their region
instead of the country. 54 Regionalists turned violent when the generalísimo, in an effort to unify
Spain, did not let them speak their own languages or acknowledge their own cultures, even at
home. In hindsight, some critics deemed this decision Franco’s most “shortsighted policy.” 55
Between the years 1962 and 1975, Franco was forced to declare nine states of emergencies and
suspend the Fuero de los Españoles, six of which were specifically for one region, the Basque
Country. 56 The Basque Country proved to be the most problematic region of Spain for Franco,
especially considering that the group Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna,
or ETA) originated there, radicalized, and eventually turned into a terrorist group that strove to
free the Basque Country. On December 20, 1973, members of ETA assassinated Admiral Luis
Carrero Blanco, 57 Franco’s first Prime Minister and right-hand man since 1941, 58 creating the
most vulnerable moment of Franco’s regime. 59
Franco faced even more opposition, this time from the Catholic Church, when the
Vatican started distancing itself from Franco’s Spain. 60 Franco presumed that his relationship
with the Pope would always be positive because even though his regime had helped the Church
more than any other former Spanish government, the generalísimo failed to understand that the
53
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Church was passing through its own crisis, the Second Vatican Council. Therefore, when Pope
Paul VI on April 29, 1968 asked Franco to give up the right to appoint bishops, something that
the former popes allowed him to do, the Caudillo did not understand why. 61
As mentioned earlier, Franco slowly retreated from authoritarianism during the last
decade of his life. On March 18, 1966, the Press and Publishing Law replaced the one created on
April 29, 1938, reducing the amount of necessary censoring before any given publishing. 62
Franco’s next move was the Law on Religious Freedom, which was approved by the Cortes on
June 28, 1967. The law claimed to outlaw discrimination against non-Catholics, made it legal to
organize and publicly practice other faiths, and removed the compulsory participation in
religious ceremonies, the army, and religiously-affiliated schools. 63 In reality, this law did not do
so much: the Law on Religious Freedom only provided tolerance, not liberty, for nonCatholics. 64
These last two slightly more tolerant laws brought Franco’s Spain up to the 1970’s.
During this time, Franco expressed the belief that his country already had stable institutions,
despite the fact that he had to declare yet another state of emergency in February of 1969. From
this point on, Franco became less flexible, 65 creating an environment in which the labor issues
worsened and the international community criticized him even more because of his severe
treatment of convicted ETA members. 66 Franco’s actions towards the ETA members were so
harsh that it caused the group to retaliate by murdering Carrero Blanco. 67 Yet, the Caudillo’s last
two political speeches offered little relief to these problems. On November 18, 1971 and January
61
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31, 1972, Franco appeared in front of his people for the last two times. On both occasions, he
repeated comments that he had already made, such as that the regime has no alternative (Spain
could only survive with Francoism), and that all political activity in Spain must be part of the
regime and work in unison with it. 68
In spite of these statements by Franco, the Prime Minister that the generalísimo selected
to take over after Carrero Blanco’s death did attempt some changes that were uncharacteristically
progressive for Francoism. After his surprise appointment in 1974, 69 Carlos Arias Navarro
restructured Franco’s cabinets 70 and championed the inclusion of the popular voice into the
political process. 71 That same year, he created policies that would provide more press freedom
and appointed a new Information Minister, Pío Cabanillas, who was responsible for the “opening
up of culture” in Spain, such as allowing nude women to be shown in the movies. 72 Arias
Navarro went so far as to try to loosen Spain’s close ties with the Church, but Franco prevented
this change from happening. 73 In the end, however, Arias Navarro was too much of a supporter
of Franco to turn Francoism into a democracy, so during his last year, Franco continued leading
an authoritarian state. 74
During the last year of the Caudillo’s life, Spain suffered through more attacks by ETA,
the firing of Cabanillas that prompted other ministers to quit, 75 and an Anti-Terrorist Decree that
permitted the death penalty and consequently shocked the world. 1975 was the most violent year
in Spain to date 76 and simultaneously experienced the least amount of Franco’s rule because the

68
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Head of State was in and out of hospitals. When Franco finally died of heart failure on
November 20, 1975, Don Juan Carlos was ready to take over, and for the first time since 1936,
Spain was not subject to the exclusive whim of the generalísimo Francisco Franco. 77
When Franco died, the average Spaniard’s was better than when Franco came into power
in 1936, but they still lived in a dictatorship in which Franco had just as much power as he did
during the Civil War. 78 However, since he was in control for so long, no one knew what a postFranco Spain would look like. Political democratic utopia was impossible in the Spain of 1939,
but what about in the Spain of 1975? 79 As stated by Arango, “…it [the death of Franco] meant
that the majority remained relatively indifferent. It could be said that a large number of Spaniards
waited without haste for the end of the regime.” 80
In some respects, despite all of the published literature and investigations, it is difficult to
know exactly what happened under Franco’s rule. Once the Francoist period was over, the key
players of the former governing body began to destroy mass amounts of official documents.
What is known for sure is that there was a lot to destroy because the Information and
Investigation Service, Franco’s security branch of the government, had collected the political
background of 2,962,853 people by 1940. Even more, if a document had survived this purge,
historians could not attain access to it, especially if it belonged in the military archives, because
of the amount of secrecy and security surrounding such information. 81 Another issue is that the
reliability of some of the sources is doubtful, and it therefore becomes difficult to draw
conclusions about many of the statistics. For example, estimates for the number of executions
during and after the Civil War performed by Franco and his men vary from 40,000 to 400,000,
77
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and this does not even cover the people in exile. 82 Franco sought to rewrite the history of Spain
and seems to have been successful due to the dubious information left for today’s generation,
starting at the very beginning of his rule, when Franco used his military to blame the rebellion
that turned into the Civil War on the Republicans and punish them through their own militaryrun political responsibility tribunals. 83
Not all of Spain was submissive during Franco’s attempts to control not only the present
and future of the country but the past as well. The most drastic cases, as mentioned above, took
place in the areas that felt, and still feel, extremely strong ties to their region as opposed to the
nation. The justification for the strict rule was often echoed in his own speeches, such as in the
1968 end-of-year message: “Without authority, men cannot live together in society. Without rule
and without government, a harmonious society cannot exist.” 84 All Franco claimed to want was
“unity among the lands and peoples of Spain,” 85 something that he rarely seemed to achieve.
The policies of Franco’s Spain worked against the group that traditionally produces the
popular culture, primarily the working middle class, stunting its development. 86 For example,
from March 9, 1938, when strikes were deemed illegal with the first Fundamental Law 87 until
1942 when he took power away from working class groups from before the war or anyone he
deemed too powerful, 88 Franco spent his tenure suppressing his own people. Naturally, the
suppressed reacted, and this reaction can be seen in the popular music produced during the era.
During the period of Francoism, the government censored and controlled all of the media, both
private and public; the regime’s actions extended to cover many mediums that are vital in the
82
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spread of music, such as radio and television, making it harder for a popular music to become
just that, popular. 89 Additionally, since the definition of popular culture dictates that it must
come from the people and not be government backed, it becomes challenging to actually gauge
what was popular because of the public opinion and not Franco’s ideals.
Knowing the public opinion is vital in order to determine if popular music is a response
to governmental policies. However, during Franco’s regime it was not common for the
government or any organization to keep lists of popular singles of every year. 90 Therefore, in
order to identify the most popular songs ever year, one must rely on lists compiled by
individuals, which are not official. The following information on artists and songs come from a
blog titled Valencia Magazine by Nicolás Ramos Pintado, compiled into lists of the top songs of
every year, starting from the year 1940. 91
From its inception in 1936, Franco’s government, in a systematic, intensive, and
exhaustive manner, used music and culture as propaganda in order to define its regime and
control the public opinion. 92 Franco took the traditional folkloric music of Spain and endorsed it
in order to support his version of history and legitimize his claim to Spain after the rebellion,
otherwise known as the Civil War. 93 Music produced in Spain during the beginning of the
regime that was backed by the dictator himself included zarzuelas that were completely void of
social commentaries but full of patriot feelings. 94 However, not everybody in the regime shared
Franco’s opinion of what defined Spanish music. In Arthur Custer’s 1962 article from The
Musical Quarterly titled “Contemporary Music in Spain,” Gerardo Gombau disagreed with
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Franco’s “typical” Spanish music because he believed “…that true Spanish music is not a matter
of tambourines and toros, but simply music written by Spaniards.” 95 The problem with this idea
is that Franco exiled many Spanish composers, so they were not able to mold the Spanish
musical identity, and therefore the music could not advance. 96
With it’s evolution on hold, the government made an effort to mass-produce a type of
music similar to the authentic Andalucían music and market it as the “typical” or “unique” music
of Spain, 97 a type of music that to this day people still associate with the country. Franco most
likely made this decision because music from Andalucía seemed less “suspicious” than that of
Catalonia or the Basque Country, knowing that it was less likely to have undertones of
independence, regionalism, or federalism. 98 The Andalucían music that was most commonly
used and then later identified as the canción española (or Spanish song) was the copla. The
copla, named for its meter, began its popularity before the war. Immediately after the war, many
people were again drawn the this style of music because it reminded them of the days before the
Second Republic, and the over-dramatized renditions by the singers identified with the people’s
suffering, especially to the oppressed people who belonged to the lower classes. The copla thus
transformed into government-approved method to express their grievances. 99
Coplas consisted of many of the most popular songs from 1939 to 1949. Estrellita
Castro’s 1939 “La morena de mi copla” personifies southern Spain, full of references to
flamenco, Andalucían cities, the Moors, and even a famous landmark, la Venta de Eritaña in
Seville. Castro’s vibrato-filled voice is reminiscent of another copla singer of the time, Conchita
Piquer, especially of her 1944 hit “La lirio.” As the copla came to represent Franco’s vision of
95
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Spain, few artists took advantage of the style of music and manipulated its formula to represent
that what Franco tried to hide. 100
During the same year that “La lirio” debuted, Miguel de Molina sang “La bien pagá.” “La
bien pagá,” a copla about a prostitute, took the traditional form of the song and attached it to a
theme that normally was not heard in a copla and became one of the most famous songs in Spain
of all time. During the Civil War, the openly homosexual Molina regularly performed for the
Republican Army but agreed to switch to entertain the Loyalists when it was clear that Franco
would win the war, as to not appear a traitor. After one circuit on tour for Franco’s army, Molina
quit in 1942 because he did not receive enough pay. Franco’s men responded to Molina’s
decision by exiling him to Argentina where he became successful but was then exiled to Mexico,
again because he was gay. Although Molina never returned to Spain, his coplas and his
reputation have been (somewhat) restored, as well as his legacy of mixing the traditional gender
roles in flamenco dancing. 101
A few years later, in 1949, Juanito Valderrama composed a copla in memory of all of the
emigrants that fled Spain during and after the Civil War. Valderrama was the first Spanish singer
to write his own songs, and in “El emigrante” he wanted the focus to fall on the feelings of grief
that came from missing Spain, not from the yearning of the past Republic or from the
suppression by Franco. The following year, the singer had the opportunity to perform it live for
the Caudillo, who requested an encore. Valderrama later stated that he was not sure if upon
hearing the song the dictator would send him to jail, but was rather surprised when Franco
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praised him as a patriot, thereby assuring that Valderrama’s music followed the generalísimo’s
vision of Spanish culture. 102
The 1950’s were filled with artists who both supported and opposed Franco and his
ideals. First, there was Ángel Sampedro Montero, or Angelillo, a singer favored by the
Republicans before the war. Despite his level of fame in Spain, Angelillo escaped to Argentina
in 1936, before Franco could exile him. From South America, Angelillo continued producing
songs that reached the top of the Spanish charts, such as 1952’s “Dos cruces.” In 1954, Angelillo
returned to Spain where he continued to sing and reconnect with old fans. 103 That same year, the
flamenco and copla singer Antonio Molina debuted “Adiós a España,” a song in which the singer
professes his love to nation. Molina, one of the most successful singer and actors in Spain of the
time, was an artist who, despite his claim to be apolitical, bought into dictator’s version of the
country by stating that flamenco and bulls represent his idea of Spain. 104
As the international community slowly accepted Franco’s Spain as a legitimate country
and foreign influences started to pour in, the copla began to fall out of fashion. 105 Critics labeled
chart-topping Gloria Lasso as a singer of “Mediterranean songs” for music halls, not coplas. By
the time her 1959 “Luna de miel” became a hit, she was already an international pop star.
Lasso’s status outside of Spain signified that the country played a role in the international culture
sphere, 106 not only the political sphere (U.S. President Eisenhower also visited Spain during the
same year). What further solidified Spain’s position in European culture was its acceptance to
the Eurovision song competition in 1961. Conchita Bautista opened the spectacle that year with
the song “Estando conmigo,” a song whose warbling chorus was very reminiscent of the coplas
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of the 1940’s. Since each country can only elect one artist to represent them, Bautista’s song
makes it very clear that Franco continued, even into the early 1960’s, to construct a very
particular identity for Spain, and this time on the world’s stage. 107
The year 1961 also brought Spain the first teen idols in Spanish music history in the form
of Dúo Dinámico. “Quince años tiene mi amor” resembled the doo-wop style from the United
States, a blatant reference to a sudden influx of foreign influence. 108 Many pop bands followed
Dúo Dinámico, such as Los Brincos, Fórmula V, and Mocedades. Los Brincos did something
unique; their 1965 hit “Flamenco” opened with a flamenco-style guitar introduction, alluding to
the Spanish tradition of coplas but quickly transitioned into a pop-y, Beatles-infused song.
Fórmula V also resembled a typical 1960’s rock band, both in 1969’s “Cuéntame” and 1973’s
“Eva María.” Mocedades’ most famous song, “Eres tú” became an international hit, including in
the United States, after the 1973 Eurovision Competition. The success of the song was not the
only gain for Spain: After that year’s contest, some believed that the “Eres tú” was plagiarized
from Yugoslavia’s 1966 entry, but the judges did not disqualify Mocedades, a decision that
suggests that at this point Europe considered Franco’s Spain to be stronger and more important
than Josip Tito’s Yugoslavia and that Spain was to be taken seriously. 109
The 1966 Eurovision scandal was not the last musical-related incident of General
Francisco Franco’s life: Catalonian Joan Manuel Serrat caused much more conflict. In 1968, the
government selected Serrat as the Spanish representative for the Eurovision Singing Contest to
perform the song “La, la, la.” However, when he requested to sing the song in the banned
language of Catalan instead of Castilian Spanish, the government replaced Serrat with the young
singer Massiel, who won the contest. Since Franco had established that only Castilian Spanish
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would be spoken in Spain, Serrat’s requests and attempts to sing in Catalan were interpreted as a
direct attack on the government. The Catalonian furthered his disobedience in 1972 when he
recorded an album named after and dedicated to Miguel Hernández, a poet killed by Franco’s
army during the Civil War and a symbol of the atrocities of the war. By 1975, the year of
Franco’s death, the government exiled Serrat from Spain. He moved to Mexico where he openly
spoke out against Franco’s government until 1976, when Serrat was allowed to re-enter Spain. 110
Serrat was one of the most prominent members of the Nova Cançó, a movement that promoted
and encouraged Catalan music in Franco’s Spain. It was the most blatant attack on Franco to
date, and new censorship laws met the push for more freedom of expression, 111 which would
soon come to an end after the generalísimo’s death. Everything in Spain was about to change.
The musical trends from 1939 to 1975 in Francoist Spain parallel those of the
government; during the first decade, Spain experienced the most repressive period of Franco’s
dictatorship, and the Caudillo wanted to establish its identity as a traditional place with
conservative laws and a culture based on a glorified life in the south. Right after the war, Franco
faced the least amount of opponents and the least amount of antagonistic music, but as Spain
made efforts to open up to the rest of the world and the United States took advantage by placing
military bases in Spain, the Spanish music drifted further away from the stereotypical coplas to
American and British inspired rock bands and internationally successful superstars. During these
years, the Caudillo began to experience more domestic resistance, as seen in the popular music
as well; of course at the beginning of the regime Miguel de Molina and Angelillo stood against
Francoism, but by the 1960’s and 1970’s enough artists publically demonstrated their disdain for
the leader and his policies that their movement, Nova Cançó, received formal recognition. Thus,
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it can be assured that a portion of the Spanish population’s death rejoiced the dictator’s death,
did not feel as impassive as Arango suggests, and was ready for the changes that the transition
period was about to bring.

Grek 25
Chapter Two: The Transition

No one in Spain knew what would happen after General Francisco Franco’s death. From
the time the generalísimo came to power during the Spanish Civil War until his last breath,
Franco ruled Spain for nearly forty years. Despite the fact that Franco made certain appointments
and had his own vision for the future of his country, the events following his passing unfolded in
an unprecedented, and unexpected, manner.
Spain experienced a transition from dictatorship to democracy during the 1970’s and
1980’s’, more specifically from 1978-1980, not a revolution. 112 The process was gradual and
difficult, and in the words of José Amodia as quoted by Omar G. Encarnación, “It is naïve to
expect Franco’s death to work as a miracle.” 113 The democratization was a transition away from
Franco’s regime towards a democracy, not a complete break from it. 114 Based on polls taken at
the time, Spaniards wanted a more gradual change and did not expect a revolution. 115
Additionally, the transitional government received support from a wide base, not just from one
group of the society. 116 There was a strong link between the previous government and the new
democracy, but this connection faded over time, 117 as seen in the polls that demonstrated that the
people of Spain tended to favor the government more during the post-Franco age than during
Franco’s dictatorship. 118
But how did the Spaniards break away from a regime that lasted nearly 40 years, a
regime that made the people of Spain think that their country was somehow distinct from other
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countries, that “…it was an inherently anarchic country in need of a strong hand”? 119 The
technocrats had begun, albeit unintentionally, preparing the country for democracy years before
Franco’s death. They rid Spain of the economic autarky that Franco put into place after the Civil
War and replaced it with policies meant to liberalize the economy and introduce collective
bargaining and a welfare state. The technocrats who, by the end of the dictator’s regime had
ascended in the system, made these changes possible because they thought that Franco’s
authoritarian policies prevented Spain from modernizing. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of
Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido
Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) survived underground, as all political parties were banned by
the generalísimo. They managed to keep the structure alive and later helped gather public
support for a new government that was based on consensus and negotiation. 120
By the time Franco passed away in 1975, Spain had advanced to become a considerably
sophisticated and large industrial power. 121 However, during these years the country’s economy
stopped growing, largely in part to the worldwide crisis that lasted from 1973-1974. 122 The
recessions and booms that Spain experienced were extreme when compared to other nations
because their market depended heavily on those of other countries and never industrialized to the
degree that the rest of Europe did. 123 These other European countries did not want to help Spain
by moving their businesses there because Spain lacked an entrepreneurial culture, an advanced
communications system, and a well-educated and well-trained specialized workforce, 124 so Spain
was left on its own.
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When Franco died on November 20, 1975, instead of allowing the institutions that the
late dictator had set up to continue after his death, King Juan Carlos I, in whom the generalísimo
had complete trust, with the help of Adolfo Suárez, Franco’s Prime Minister, changed the plan.
With the help from these two leaders, Spain transitioned from an authoritarian state to a
democracy, even without punishing any of Franco’s supporters or family members. 125 King Juan
Carlos and Adolfo Suarez thus set out to destroy the government and the continuismo that they
were poised to assume. 126
The following fall, the Francoist Parliament voted through a package of policy reforms
that undid much of Franco’s laws, such as the legalization of trade unions, political parties, and
private organizations. The government also organized an election for the following year,
essentially voting out the old political system, and therefore themselves, and shifting towards a
more democratic structure. In June of 1977, Adolfo Suárez and what eventually evolved into the
Center-Right party, Unión de Centro Democrático, or UCD, became the first prime minister in
Spain as a result of the first free election in 40 years. 127 Despite the fact that the party won the
election, many of the members of UCD formerly belonged to Franco’s government, and
therefore did not seem very credible as a democratic government, something that they had to
work hard to overcome. 128 As Prime Minister, and former member of the Falange (the only
political organization under Franco), Suárez was entrusted to create a new political system,
reverse the economic crisis, and convince the whole country, even his opposition, to transition to
a democratic government. 129
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Considering that during the election Spain had not ratified a new constitution, the leaders
of the country met after the election to construct the Moncloa Pacts, a set of agreements reached
during October of 1977 that became the formal end to Francoism. 130 The goal of the pacts was
to set up a democracy and secure it as peacefully as possible. Furthermore, the Moncloa Pacts
increased the spending on the unemployed, created more jobs (especially governmental jobs),
and expanded the welfare state that lasted until 1984. 131 The Moncloa Pacts are now seen as the
official start to the democratic rule in Spain 132 and were significant because the formation and
legitimization of the Spanish democracy depended on them; their influence on structural
adjustment was not very real, but symbolic. 133
Following the Moncloa Pacts, a congressional constitution subcommittee made up of
seven important politicians from the Cortes Constituyentes, three from the UCD, and one each
from the AP (People’s Alliance, or Alianza Popular), PSOE, PCE, and Democratic Pact for
Catalonia (the Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya), began work in secret on a new Spanish
constitution. The draft they produced on April 10, 1978, the Ante-Proyecto, moved forward to
the Congressional Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Public Liberties, where from May
1978 until June 1978 members reviewed the document and transformed it into the Proyecto
Constitucional. The Proyecto Constitucional passed to the general Congress, where the vast
majority approved it that following month. Next, during the months of August and September of
that year, a Senate Constitutional Committee edited the draft and submitted it to the general
Senate, who supported their version of the constitution on October 5, 1978. 134
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The next step in the process of constitution ratification was to compare and combine the
Senate-approved and Congress-approved versions of the constitution into one text. This process
was conducted by a small group of political leaders, and the resulting draft gained approval from
both houses of the Cortes on October 31, 1978. 135 On December 6, 87% of the Spanish people
voted in favor of the constitution, which twenty-one days later was approved by the king.
Finally, on December 29, 1978, the new constitution took effect, and is still in place to this day,
solidifying Spain as a democratic nation with a constitutional monarchy. 136
The new constitution outlined the national and regional governmental powers, but was
very vague. The lack of clarity came about as a solution to gain agreement and avoid losing
legitimacy of the regime on accounts of topics such as electoral law, religion, and economy. 137
In regards to the centralization of the Spanish government, the Democratic Pact for Catalonia
(the Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya) was able to reach more of a general consensus than the
Basque National Party (PNV, or Partido Nacionalista Vasco): 138 In they eyes of the Catalonia
party members, the minority regions of Spain had never before achieved as much independence
as the new Constitution was willing to offer them so they accepted its terms. 139 The Basque
representatives, on the other hand, wanted more explicit rights, especially ones that
acknowledged their historic rights, or fueros, such as self-determination, and when the rest of the
Cortes did not grant them this concession, the party members walked out of the Constitution
talks and continuously voted against the new charter. 140 Despite the disapproval from the Basque
Country, the Constitution of 1978 vowed to protect the cultural heritage of all of the people of
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Spain (Article 3.3) by establishing the seventeen Autonomous Communities (Article 137), each
with its own government, institutions (Article 148), anthem, and flag (Article 4), but did not give
the same degree of independence to every region. For example, the Communities with the most
autonomy are the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia, three parts of Spain that traditionally
have the strongest regional ties and cause the most trouble for the national government. 141
Between the years 1979 and 1983, some of the Autonomous Communities, starting with
Catalonia and the Basque Country, passed autonomy statues. These statues established certain
priorities for the various heritages found in Spain, such as identity, tradition, and culture.142
Furthermore, names within the regions that had associations with Franco and his regime changed
and signs were translated into the local language. City centers and old neighborhoods
transformed and became popular once again, 143 and some of the local fiestas, or festivals, came
back to life. The culmination of these regional efforts arrived in 1984, when United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) officially started protecting
Spanish heritage. 144
Following the implementation of the Constitution, Adolfo Suárez asked the king to
dissolve the Cortes and call for a new election. Suárez wished for the people of Spain to deem
the new democracy legitimate through a popular vote and therefore make them more than just a
transitional government. The national election took place on March 1, 1979, for the members of
congress and senate, and the municipal elections on April 3. 145 The resulting government, in
conjunction with the new Constitution, gave more autonomy to the individual parts of Spain and
acted more progressively than people had previously anticipated. Adolfo Suárez and the UCD
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took credit for the relatively peaceful evolution of the country from a dictatorship to a
democracy. 146 By the end of the year 1979, many of the transitional movements had been
completed, such as installing a new governmental framework and establishing political parties,
and the democracy, for the most part, was secure. 147
One thing that Adolfo Suárez’s government was not able to transform was Spain’s
economy. Nancy Bermeo attributes this frustration as the “electoral sacrifice” of the first
winners: The first ruling party of a newly formed democracy cannot afford to take many risks
because the state is still fragile, and it is only when this first party loses the next election and the
opposition peacefully takes over that democracy is secured and the government can take chances
with their policies. 148 In other words, this party must prioritize stabilizing the democracy and
therefore is forced to sacrifice large-scale economic changes. 149
The following decade, the 1980’s, brought even greater changes to Spain. The decade did
not begin smoothly, with the Spaniards starting to show signs of lessening faith in democracy, or
the desencanto, 150 and a failed military coup during February of 1981. The positive outcome of
the attempt to overthrow the government was that its failure to do so proved that the democracy
was stable and that Suárez’s efforts were worthwhile.
In 1982, Spain experienced its second free elections. The desencanto felt in Spain
affected the election because the people became less eager to mobilize and connect to a specific
party or politician, and thus fewer votes were cast. 151 In the end, the PSOE, led by Felipe
González, emerged victorious and the event marked the first peaceful exchange of power from
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one side of the political spectrum to the other, an event that in the 1930’s caused the Civil War.
González’s victory was especially momentous because it represented the first time that the Left
held the political power in Spain since the existence of the Second Republic. 152 The most intense
phase of the transition had now officially ended; years had passed since the death of Franco, so
the chance of the democracy failing and the economy collapsing decreased, and the Spanish
people began to vote more moderately. 153
During Felipe’s González’s first term as Prime Minister from 1982-1986, Spain
transformed into a capitalist state with a strengthened economy. 154 This government is
considered to have succeeded in economic liberalization because it was purposefully
implemented, not necessarily because of the results. For a while, Spain was considered to have
the fastest growing economy in Europe, 155 but during 1984, Spain experienced the downsizing
and privatization of industries 156 as well as the change to an easier way to create contracts for
temporary and part-time workers, which created more jobs and made the labor market more
flexible. 157 These economic advances helped to further integrate Spain into the world stage:
Since the Spanish government prioritized securing its democracy over the reconstruction of
industries, 158 Spain was finally accepted into the Economic Community in 1986. 159 González
and the PSOE’s combined strength were a result of the time that it had to consolidate during the
UCD’s term: the people saw González as the uncontested leader, which created an image of
solidarity within the party. 160
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Felipe González continued to rule past the end of Spain’s transition into the democracy,
and finally ended his tenure in 1996. The transition is described not so much as a change from
Franco to Suárez to González (of from Francoism to the UCD to the PSOE), but a switch from
an authoritarian regime to a democracy. 161 It is incredible is that this legitimate democratic
government peacefully emerged from a dictatorship because it had failed to happen many times
throughout history all around the world.
How is it that Spain was able to reach a state of democratic legitimacy? According to
Encarnación, the most important element in the making of a successful democracy after an
authoritarian regime is the leaders. Before his death, Franco picked Prince Juan Carlos as the
new king, and Juan Carlos broke his promise to uphold the regime and, in the eyes of the Spanish
people, legitimized the new democracy by remaining their king during the transition. The other
leader who played a vital role was Adolfo Suárez, the Prime Minister who made it clear that
there would only be legitimacy in the reform if there was a constitutional, democratic framework
as its support. 162 Furthermore, a new democracy receives legitimacy if it is an impartial regime
that serves more than just one ideal, region, or group of people, something that Spain managed to
accomplish. In other words, it is crucial that the government keeps in mind that people in varying
communities or subcultures will perceive legitimacy differently. 163
In the case of Spain, there are other determinants of legitimacy, especially when viewing
the democracy in comparison with the Franco regime. The previous regime evoked stronger
emotions, especially negative ones, from the public than the democracy did. 164 Next, the
democratic regime is not as closely tied to certain ideas and interests as Franco’s was, and
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therefore experienced more autonomy and signified a major advance in Spain’s politics. Lastly,
democracy of the 1930’s forced the socialists and conservatives to act against each other, but the
new democracy did not function in that manner. 165
The effects of Spain’s transition during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s can not only be
seen in the politics and economy of the time, but in the society as well. As a whole, the
generation after Franco valued openness as a direct result of the secretive regime that had held
power over them for nearly 40 years. For example, the country wanted to host international
events in order to invite the world to experience Spain first hand and received a level of
acceptance and equality with its induction to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in
May of 1982 and the EU (formerly known as the EEC, or the European Economic Community)
in June of 1985. 166
Despite the seemingly normalization of Spain’s society, the country missed out on social
advances that other countries experienced while Franco’s grip still controlled the country. 167
Spain never fully underwent a feminist movement, and the work towards equality was, and
continues to this day, to not be very effective, as seen in the weak abortion rights law and the
ignored legislation for equal opportunities. Moreover, the working class did not have a clear
identity and the unions were not very strong. 168 During the mid-1970’s, experts believed that the
urban social movements could encourage the democratization of Spain and make it more
profound by pressuring for social reforms. Instead, the number of social movements decreased
and switched their tactics from protests to negotiation and compromise. 169 Around 1976, some of
the parties, such as the PCE who championed the workers, supported the government’s actions
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because they believed that this limited form of democracy of the 1970’s was better than the lack
of democracy they experienced under Franco, in essence making their parties more moderate. 170
The following year, a year after the Communists and Socialists abandoned their idea of
“democratic rupture” in Spain, the urban social movements met their demise. 171

As an

explanation for this fall, Hipsher says that rebellious groups tend to decline when democracy is
restored because democracies usually are more open and do not rely on repression to gain control
of the population. 172
Another social decline during Spain’s transition can be found in the control of the
Catholic Church on the morality of the people. 173 The Church had much less influence in Spain
during the democracy than the dictatorship, and consequentially, the people began to act against
the advice of the Church. 174 Under Franco’s regime, families were larger and the people strictly
followed the marital doctrine of the Catholic Church. However, during the transition, the
attitudes towards abortion and divorce became less harsh 175 and contraceptives became more
available, resulting in a drastically diminishing birth rate during the 1970’s and 1980’s. 176
Additionally, for the first time, Spain had vocal feminist organizations, as well as left-wing
politicians, that had the ability to sway public opinion, educate women, and allow them to make
choices about their own bodies. 177 Lastly, Franco’s death also corresponded with an increase in
the Spanish people identifying themselves as atheists and a decrease in the society considering
themselves to be Catholics. 178
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The freedom and education that the people of Spain experienced during the transition was
bolstered by the changes in the media. The Spanish people wanted to become and stay informed,
so the government lessened the restrictions and permitted the daily publication of minority
language newspapers around Spain. Franco and his government no longer had a tight grip on the
state-run radio and television stations, which as a result began to represent the majority’s
opinion, not just the opinion of the dictator. More radical still, “less-moral” material began to
appear in the form of pin-ups in magazines, which demonstrated that the Catholic Church had as
well lost its control of the media. 179
Many of the changes that the media underwent could not have happened without the
Constitution of 1978. Of the elements of the Constitution that dealt with media, highlights
include, Article 20, which guaranteed the freedom of expression, prohibited censorship, and
allowed regionalism in broadcasting and Article 38, which established a free market economy. In
addition to the Constitution, the Estatuo de la radio y la televisión (the Statute of Radio and
Television) of 1980 established a framework for the supervision of the radio and television in
Spain, a service that became essential to the public during the transition. 180
The widespread use of radio and television signaled the advent of mass-consumer culture
in Spain, which encouraged the youth culture that had resisted Franco’s regime and politicized
their expressions. 181 In reality, the youth culture of Spain began during the last twenty years of
the dictator’s rule, when many people migrated from the countryside to the cities, more of the
country’s youth received higher education, and a large percentage of these students did not
receive jobs as expected. 182 The situation worsened with an international crisis in 1973 and
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Spain’s attempt to switch from agriculture and industry to a service-based economy because
many jobs were destroyed despite the fact that the large youth generation sought jobs and no
welfare state existed. 183 As a result, many young adults had no choice but to continue living with
their parents, which delayed their transition to an independent adulthood. The listless youth
began to give in to social pressures and “live for the moment,” which for some translated into an
increased consumption of drugs and alcohol and apathetic feelings towards the politics of the
time. 184
The youth culture experienced in Spain during the years of the transition from the
dictatorship to the democracy was distinct in comparison to the experiences of other countries
because it did not carry the same level of social significance. The trends in Spain did not receive
labels such as “deviant” or “resistance movement” or “counterculture” because they came about
right at the end of Franco’s rule when the whole countr was suddenly liberated. 185 In other
words, since all aspects of society were undergoing changes, the transition of the youth did not
seem radical when in an established democracy it might have.
After Franco’s death, the youth, especially university students in Madrid and
consequently spreading out from there, began spending the weekend nights dancing and drinking
in the clubs. 186 During the late 1970’s, the older generations viewed the younger generation as
being self-indulgent, seeking out sex, drugs, and rock music. In the 1980’s, when Spain became
more integrated into Western Europe, the Spanish youth finally started being perceived as those
of the rest of Europe, as a “youth problem.” 187 Members of the “youth problem” became
obsessed with such things that had formally been prohibited or taboo, for example sex.
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Eventually, the habit of indulgence extended to hard drugs, which inevitably led to the spread of
diseases such as AIDS. 188
Spain’s youth culture of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s expressed itself musically in a
movement called la movida madrileña (the Madrid movement). La movida madrileña, also
known as the Spanish New Wave, is now perceived as the most successful movement in Spanish
popular music to date. 189 This new movement took place almost completely in Madrid, giving
the music rooted in punk a social, cultural, and economic capital, unlike the other genres that
came from the struggling surrounding suburbs. 190 La movida represented Spain at the time
because it differed radically from all of the music previously produced in Spain and embraced
the newest groundbreaking trends. Heavy metal and hard rock already had an association with
the singer-songwriter style that, during the end of Franco’s regime, sang protest songs against the
generalísimo, 191 like these other styles of music, la movida also spoke of politics, but it did so by
describing it through personal experiences, not just protesting Madrid and its government. 192
In retrospect, the 1980’s are referred to as Spain’s “golden age of pop music” because of
the sounds produced by the youth culture. 193 In the years leading up to this age, Madrid
experienced a sudden explosion of groups, venues, radio stations, and record labels. The
movement began when a group of young punk fans in Madrid started gathering during the
Sunday markets and formed a band, Kaka de Luxe. Kaka de Luxe split up before it ever recorded
an album, but the members formed new bands, each one pertaining to a common set of traits: All
of the bands of la movida renounced politicized music like that of the singer/songwriters, sang in
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Spanish, supported self-indulgent behaviors, and refused to use the nationalist styles that Franco
had endorsed, such as flamenco, pasodoble, and copla. 194
Within a short period of time, the feelings of excitement and innovation spread beyond
the Madrid city limits to the rest of Spain. 195 In 1981, Radio Nacional de España created Radio
3, a nationally broadcasted public radio that allowed the young generation all over Spain to hear
the musical developments of Madrid. 196 As a result, similar trends and New Wave groups formed
in other cities, but these are not considered to be part of la movida madrileña because of their
geographic location. 197 The creative energy overflowed from musicians to designers, painters,
photographers, filmmakers, 198 and even journalists (for example, La luna de Madrid, founded in
November of 1983, became the magazine of la movida), 199 reaching many different parts and
sectors of Spanish youth life.
La movida and its resulting influences provide a reflection of an era when the people had
more free time, the willingness to try creative projects, fewer responsibilities, not many political
opinions, and a craving for alcohol, sex, and drugs. The youth realized that the government did
no prioritize their needs and concerns, and as a result became disenchanted. The disenchantment,
or desencanto, transformed itself into a driving force of la movida. 200
Ironically, while the youth was losing its interest in the government, the government
attempted to use la movida as a tool to deal with the transition. The government and media took
advantage of the movement and attempted to use it as a way to represent, both audibly and
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visually, the transition that Spain underwent after Franco’s death. 201 In Madrid, the mayor Tierno
Galván from PSOE used the taxpayers’ money to support la movida madrileña. Tierno
manipulated the movement to connect with the young, apathetic generation, 202 which prompted
the underground movement to become mainstream. 203 Some theorize that this governmental
support brought the demise of la movida madrileña 204 since it ended between the years 1984 and
1985, right after the government became involved. Other contributing factors to the end of the
movement include the closing of one of the most famous movida venues, Rock-Ola in 1985, and
the increase in consumption of more serious drugs until it became a serious problem in Spain. 205
As a result of Franco’s death and a sudden influx of Western European influences, the
definition of popular music in Spain shifted to one that perfectly described the music of la
movida madrileña. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, “pop music” referred to a number of
styles of non-classical music with Anglo-Saxon origins that formed in the twentieth century.
Today, many subgenres such as pop, pop-rock, and rock reside under the label of “pop music,”
but during the time of the transition in Spain, all of the terms were synonymous. Pop music
transformed into mass culture because it is a product that is produced in massive quantities and
sold to a massive audience in order to communicate to a massive amount of people. This type of
music tends to have a short-lived span and a young cult following and it is not part of elite
culture because the traditional, expensive artistic perspective is not the most important
element. 206 Most importantly, pop music of this time becomes a way to rebel against and exclude
the adult world, forming a youth culture within itself. 207
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When Franco died, the younger generations perceived Spain as something of which they
disapproved and as society similar to what Franco wanted: anti-modern, withdrawn, and ultrareactionary. These elements created a situation in which the country was more susceptible to a
radical discovery of rock ‘n’ roll than in other countries in Western Europe. This genre of music
represented everything that Franco had hated and had tried to keep out of his country, like
freedom and change. 208 When Spain first started experiencing rock music, the rest of Western
Europe had already passed through this stage of discovery. To international standards, this “new”
music in Spain was already outdated, and it seemed as if Spain was struggling to socially catch
up to the same level. 209
One of the musical stars of the beginning of the transition in 1975, Manolo Otero, came
from a musically traditional background that the deceased dictator would have approved of. The
son of a zarzuela and opera singer and an actress, 210 Manolo began singing at the age of 14 under
the tutelage of his godmother, a prominent music teacher in Madrid. 211 By the time Manolo
gained fame through his first hit, “Todo el tiempo del mundo” in 1975, Otero had joined the
National Theater Company in Madrid. “Todo el tiempo del mundo” combined the artist’s
passions for music and for acting because the lyrics are almost spoken, as if he is dictating an
intimate letter to his lover. The lyrics are overtly sexual, something that would not have been
permitted under the censorship of the late dictator: “Y pienso en aquellas mañanas / y siento aún
el calor / de nuestros cuerpos, / que entre las sábanas / formaban una cárcel maravillosa / de la
que nos resistíamos a huir.” 212Although his style was relatively traditional, with the help of his
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suggestive lyrics, appearance, and first wife María José Cantudo, Manolo Ortero became a sex
symbol during the transition period of Spain, 213 a country whose society was experimenting with
sexuality for the first time.
Another sex symbol of the early transition period was Miguel Bosé. In 1977, on the TVE
show Esta Noche…Fiesta, Bosé, originally Luis Miguel Dominguín, debuted his song “Linda” in
front of the whole country, converting himself into a phenomenon of the masses. During the
duration of the 1970’s, Bosé continued producing similar music to “Linda,” ballads of young
love. However, the advent of the 1980’s brought a change to the artist’s style, mostly from
influence from the artists he befriended who were a part of la movida. The album that he
recorded during this time, Miguel, has a much more experimental sound, such as in the song
“Bravo muchachos,” which has a clear rock influence. Bosé’s music earned him recognition in
other countries, such as France and Italy, and even as far as Latin America, allowing him to
continue singing for over 30 years. 214
The first radically different musical success in Spain came in the form of Radio Futura in
1980. Radio Futura was founded in part by Herminio Molero who previously experimented with
a pop orchestra 215 and Enrique Sierra who was a founding member of Kaka de Luxe, one of the
first bands of la movida. 216 Together, Radio Futura created a sound that previously had not been
heard in Spain. Their 1980 hit, “Enamorado de la moda juvenil,” turned the band members into
idols of the youth generation and the song into an anthem. 217 It is easy to see why the young
generation of la movida so readily accepted song “Enamorado de la moda juvenil” as their
anthem: “Enamorado de la moda juvenil” “celebrates the youth energy, consumption and
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fashion” of la movida and is now considered to be one of the most important songs of Spain’s
“golden age of popular music.” 218 The song is about Madrid and its attitude during la movida; it
speaks of the Puerta del Sol, a famous plaza in the center of the capital, the mass-consumer
culture, and the reassurance that they are living the future at that moment.
Another band from la movida, Coz, formed for the first time in 1974 but did not produce
a hit until 1981. The band, one of the pioneers of Spanish rock, aided the evolution of Spanish
music in the early 1980’s with “Las chicas son guerreras.” 219 The song provides a different view
of women, one other than delicate, beautiful objects of love letters: According to Coz, girls are
fighters who stand up for and go after what they want. The women described in the song are
strong who yield a lot of power, and come in all different forms; from natural beauties to
supermodels in magazines, from blondes to brunettes. 220
Within the next two years, the music of Spain began a shift away from rock and towards
other new styles, such as electric and synth-pop. Azul y Negro became the precursor of Spanish
electronic music and changed the way to record and listen to music. None of these advances
could have taken place without the new technologies of the times, especially the ones that arrived
to Spain as a demand of the artists of la movida who wanted to control the producing and
recording stages of their art. 221 The lyrics of this number one song, “No tengo tiempo,” are not
particularly innovative; they repeat the same theme of not having enough time over and over
again. Instead, the significance of Azul y Negro lies in the sounds and the process, not so much
in the words.
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The last great group of the transition period only gained mainstream fame at the very end
of la movida: Alaska y Dinarama. Alaska had previously been with another band, Alaska y
Pegamoides, also one of the first bands of la movida after Kaka de Luxe, which evolved into
Alaska y Dinarama. Their successful song of 1985 “Ni tú ni nadie” was actually off of their
second album, Deseo carnal from 1984. With “Ni tú ni nadie” and all of their later hits, Alaska y
Dinarama broke the barrier between commercial and independent success. Alaska became so
well known that she reached the modern level of “pop star” and an icon not only in Spain, but in
Latin America as well, where she often toured. 222
Alaska y Dinarama’s sudden burst to fame coincides with the public, and monetary,
endorsement of la movida madrileña by the mayor of Madrid. By this year, 1985, the political
transition in Spain ended, and the economic one was about to draw to a close. The PSOE ‘s first
term in the new democratic government of Spain continued to shape the country past the days of
the fledgling democracy. The transition attempted to lessen the threat of an increase in violence
and repression that existed under Franco and was an evolution, not a revolution, because the
people did not overthrow the dictator or demand change; he died and then his regime slowly
reformed itself. 223 In sum, the transition did exactly what it was supposed to do; prepare the
country for the next step forward, whether it is a democratic government or hip-hop or indie rock
music.
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Chapter Three: The Modern Spanish Democracy

Thanks to the work of King Juan Carlos, Adolfo Suárez, Felipe González, their respective
administrations, and the collaborating opposition parties, by the mid-1980’s, the rest of the world
perceived Spain as a legitimate democracy. Even in Spain, the majority of the people backed the
democracy, giving little support for any other type of regime. 224 In fact, by the early 1990’s, just
over fifteen years after the death of Franco, the support for democracy in Spain equaled the
support for democracy in other countries around Western Europe. 225
These positive feelings towards the democratic system in modern Spain, however, were
not always matched with sentiments of satisfaction with the current politics. System efficacy, or
the capability of a government to solve problems that its citizens think are important, is an
unrelated concept that is separate from governmental legitimacy. 226 In fact, according to José
Ramón Monetro, Richard Gunther, and Mariano Torcal’s article “Democracy in Spain:
Legitimacy, Discontent, and Disaffection,” democratic governments “…can remain stable even
in the face of high levels of dissatisfaction with the system…system survival is rooted in
attitudes towards legitimacy, rather than satisfaction or perceptions of system efficacy.” 227
The modern Spanish democracy experienced its first wave of discontent during the
desencanto of the transition phase and its second surge during the 1990’s. During the latter, a
combination of the economic crisis, political scandal, and governmental violence against the
Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom or its
abbreviated form, ETA) created a negative attitude in the Spaniards towards their government.
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Additionally, results from research performed by the Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados
(Institute of Advanced Social Studies) reveal that Spaniards thought, and still think, that their
politicians are much more corrupt than the average Spanish citizen 228 and that they cannot
control the behavior of the politicians because these individuals seem to have some level of
immunity in their corruption. 229 Only after the government shifted from the left to the right with
the Partido Popular’s (PP or People’s Party) electoral victory did the general mood begin to shift
to become more positive. 230
The prime minister of Spain during the time of the second wave of discontent was Felipe
González, the leader of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or the Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party). González governed from 1982-1996, bringing his country out of its transition
phase and solidifying a legitimate democracy. During his time, the European Community, the
predecessor to the European Union, elected to extend membership to Spain, a move that meant
that the other countries of the European Community would help Spain during its periods of
economic struggle in order to regain stability, which would prove vital in the years to come. 231
This membership also benefited Spain because in creating closer ties with other European
countries, Spain gained the opportunity to observe, experience, and borrow from the cultures of
other nations. Three years after its 1986 admission, González, overconfident with Spain’s
modern development, stated that his country was more successful at that moment than it was
under Charles V, yet the reality was that, despite its lack of dictatorship, the country still
remained somewhat intellectually and culturally isolated in Europe. 232
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During the general elections of 1989, Felipe González campaigned for reelection against
José María Aznar of the Partido Popular. During this term, scandal surrounded González
because the citizens discovered that their prime minister had initiated an illegal “dirty war”
against ETA, beginning in 1983 and lasting until 1987. The PSOE-affiliated Anti-terrorist
Liberation Groups (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación or GAL) kidnapped and assassinated
ETA members, and once revealed to the Spanish public, participants of GAL, including
González’s former Interior Minister José Barrionuvo and Secretary of State Rafael Vera, were
tried and sentenced to jail for their participation in this “dirty war.” 233 However, despite these
scandalous revelations, González emerged victorious during the 1986 elections, suggesting that
Spaniards still had a hard time trusting a party made up of former Franco supporters and that
they were still enamored with González’s charisma. 234
During his next term as Prime Minister of Spain, González focused on improving the
relations between Spain and the Arab world, which have always had intertwining histories. In
1992, González’s administration hosted the Middle East Peace Conference to create friendlier
ties with countries such as Morocco, Spain’s immediate neighbor. The success of this conference
led to the Oslo Peace Process, an attempt to resolve some of the conflicts in the Middle East. 235
Nonetheless, despite these foreign efforts, González’s name was still attached to domestic
scandal and corruption, such as the ongoing illegal efforts against ETA. Regardless of
González’s sullied reputation, in the eyes of the Spanish citizens these wrongdoings paled in
comparison with those of José María Aznar, who’s team attempted to blackmail González,
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resulting in yet another González victory in 1993. This term would prove be the Minister’s final
four years in office because he promised to step down right before the 1996 election. 236
In 1996, Aznar and the PP finally achieved victory, marking the first time a right-wing
prime minister led modern Spain. José María Aznar entered the political sphere in the 1970’s
after publishing a series of articles in which he assumed a pro-Franco stance. Aznar also had
previously criticized the 1978 Constitution’s use of the word “nationality” when dealing with the
Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, although he did eventually shed some of these extreme
ideas and adopted a slightly more moderate mindset. In the 1980’s, Aznar rose to the top ranks of
the Alianza Popular (People’s Alliance) and aided its conversion into the Partido Popular, and
in 1985 was elected the minister of Castile and León. 237 By end of the decade, Aznar emerged as
the leader of the PP and slowly began furthering the Spanish center away from its socialist
leanings towards a more conservative country. 238 His principles changed again when on April
19, 1995, one year before his general election victory to become Prime Minister of Spain, Aznar
almost died in an ETA attack. 239 From this moment on, the future Prime Minister thought of
himself as one of the many Spanish victims of terrorism, which inspired his belief that
negotiating with terrorists was undemocratic and an insult to terrorist victims, a principle that he
carried to his position as head of Spain. 240
During his first term, the PP remained relatively moderate because they held a minority
government and needed to be able to achieve intra-party consensus in Congress. After his
victory, Aznar promised Spain that he would lead a cleaner government, but the PP, just like the
PSOE, became involved in many scandals. The difference between the two parties, however, was
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that Aznar’s administration more successfully hid their scandals, so that it appeared as if there
was more political corruption before 1996, during González’s term. 241
Four months after Aznar’s victory, ETA assassinated the young PP councilor Miguel
Ángel Blanco, causing mass protests against terrorism in Spain. During the first wave of antiterrorist protests, even the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV or Basque Nationalist Party), the
largest political party in the Basque Country, supported the national movement, until they
realized that the PP was manipulating its anti-ETA agenda to combat Basque nationalism by
encouraging the idea that the Basque Country bred and fostered terrorism. Despite the PNV’s
withdrawal of support from the anti-terrorism protests, a surge of overt nationalism engulfed
Spain, continuously fostered by the PP in charge. 242
Conversely, the people of the Basque Nationalist Party pushed for more regional
sovereignty than ever before. In 1998, the PNV formally expressed its desire for more power
from the national government and a ceasefire with ETA, 243 crafting the Lizarra Declaration
during September of that year. The Basque Country’s efforts to negotiate with terrorists and take
power away from the central government consequently enraged the rest of Spain, most of which
did not support the declaration. 244 Undeterred by this reaction, the PNV achieved its first-ever
ceasefire with ETA, but the period of peace ended in 1999 and the PNV emerged from the deals
more radical than it had been before. 245
During the 2000 Spanish general election, the people reelected Aznar to a second term as
Prime Minister. The Partido Popular won the majority of the seats in the government, marking
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the first time in modern Spain that the right held an absolute majority in the government. 246 With
less of a need to appease the opposition party members in Congress, Aznar’s second
administration quickly adopted a more nationalistic approach that offended many in the Basque
Country and in Catalonia. 247 When the PNV dominated their 2001 regional election, the PP and
PSOE together signed an anti-terrorist “pact of state” that criticized the PNV by suggesting that
the PNV was somehow linked to terrorism. 248 The following year, the PP alienated the PNV
even more by creating a new law that banned Batasuna, ETA’s alleged political party. 249 Aznar
attempted to extend this law to allow him to severely punish PNV leaders who sought selfdetermination, but Congress deemed this movement an abuse of power and was consequently
stopped. 250
Aznar’s attention to foreign policy also contributed largely to his second term as prime
minister: Aznar decided to focus Spain’s attention more on its relationship with the United States
and Great Britain and less on Germany and France, Spain’s traditional continental European
allies. Months after his reelection in January of 2001, Aznar’s new Foreign Minister Josep Piqué
signed a pact with the United States’ Secretary of State Madeline Albright to strengthen SpainU.S. relations. 251 Following the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attacks on New York City, Aznar
publicized his own anti-terrorist actions in Spain in order to empathize with the United States
and make his country an internationally respected player. 252 The attacks on New York City
finally aligned United States President George W. Bush with Aznar on the topic of terrorism
(Bush formerly did not agree with some of Aznar’s more drastic ideas), and from this point
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onward, Bush backed all of Aznar’s policies against ETA and their affiliated groups 253 and the
Spanish Prime Minister supported Bush’s wish to invade Iraq by sending troops in 2003, a very
unpopular move in the eyes of the Spanish people. 254
The following year marked some of the first major mistakes of Aznar’s second term in
office: Initially, the Prime Minister and his party did not approve of the federal government’s
formal attempt to label Franco’s regime as undemocratic and recognize its victims. At this point,
27 years after the death of Franco, many bodies from the mass graves created by the Franco
regime remained uncovered and unidentified. When the Spanish people wished to pay their
respects, the Partido Popular prevented them from doing so. Only during the second attempt to
pass this motion did the PP reluctantly agree to acknowledge Franco’s unacceptable actions. 255
Another major scandal of 2002 was the Prestige disaster. In November, an oil tanker sank
off the coast of Spain, and Aznar and his administration did very little to rectify the situation and
clean the area. Additionally, Aznar greatly delayed his visit to the polluted area and the PP later
refused to take any of the responsibility for the way they that they handled the crisis, both of
which infuriated the citizens of Spain. The Partido Popular faulted again in 2003 when the
Ukrainian Yak-42 aircraft that Spain rented to transport its troops home from Afghanistan
crashed in Turkey, killing everybody on board. Subsequent investigations revealed that the PP
knew when they paid for the planes that they were poorly maintained, and yet allowed their
troops to fly them. 256
At this point, nearing the end of his second term, José María Aznar knew that he would
not attempt to run for a third term, so he selected Mariano Rajoy as his successor, the new leader
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of the Partido Popular. Aznar worked during the first months of 2004 to guarantee an easy
victory for Rajoy in the March vote, and up until a few days before the election itself, experts
predicted that the opposition, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the PSOE, did not have any
hope of winning. Zapatero’s prospects seemed grim because even the PSOE did not have full
confidence in the inexperienced leader who had to run against a party that had just won two
consecutive elections. 257
On March 11, 2004, Spain experienced the “…biggest postwar terrorist outrage ever on
mainland Western Europe:” A dozen bombs exploded in Madrid’s Atocha Train Station, killing
almost 200 and injuring more than 1,000 people. Ángel Acebes, the Interior Minister, insisted
that ETA had placed the bombs there, an illogical explanation because it did not follow ETA’s
style and the Basque organization appeared to be especially weak at this point in time. 258 Aznar
even gave newspaper editors his ‘personal assurance’ that ETA held all of the responsibility.
That evening, despite the reports issued that all of the evidence named Al Qaeda, not ETA, the
responsible party, the PP continued to blame ETA. 259
By Election Day, five non-ETA arrests had been made, and Aznar could no longer blame
the Basque terrorist organization. Consequently, Mariano Rajoy lost the election, a result that
implied that the voters wanted to punish Aznar and his government for their response to the
tragedy. 260 Zapatero’s victory signaled that Spain had a very mature electorate because they
demonstrated the ability to keep up with and vote according to events that had rapidly developed
three days before the election and not believe the lies from the government. Even more
significant, the PP was able to, albeit after a period of time, democratically accept the defeat and
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peacefully pass the power from the right to the left side, confirming again that the democracy
was strong enough to withstand such a drastic change. 261
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero began his journey to the head of the PSOE in 2000 when
he attempted to rebuild the party to make it appeal to a younger demographic. Zapatero targeted
the voters who had transitioned to the Partido Popular and groups that usually strayed away
from the PSOE, such as the feminists, LGBT community, and environmentalists. 262 In 2002,
while Aznar fostered his relationship with President Bush, Zapatero ascended to the PSOE
leadership position because of his strong anti-Iraq War stance. 263 In fact, he even declared that if
he won the 2004 general election, he would take the 1,300 Spanish troops out of Iraq, a war with
a 90% disapproval rating in Spain, and a task that he did accomplish. 264
As Prime Minister, Zapatero first focused on social issues. On April 22, 2005, Spain
legalized gay marriage, the first country with a Catholic majority to do so. 265 Even though the PP
reacted in a hostile manner in parliament and then later protested in the streets, almost 66% of
Spanish citizens approved of the new law. 266 The new Prime Minister then rid public facilities,
such as schools, jails, and courthouses, of religious symbols and abolished the compulsory
religious teaching in public schools. 267 Zapatero went further to change some of Franco’s lasting
effects and redefine history with the Law of Historical Memory. Under this law, the government
aimed to gather every claim of torture, murder, etc., during the Spanish Civil War and the
dictatorship and coerce each responsible person to monetarily compensate their victims, discover
and dig up mass graves, and remove the monuments that honored the regime. Along with
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attacking Franco, these measures seemed to target the Church since many of the monuments
were located in churches. Zapatero had to be cautious not to create a law that was too drastic
because the Prime Minister had to preserve the amnesty that was granted in 1977 to Franco’s
followers, a vital post-dictatorship measure that helped usher in the democracy, and protect the
monuments that had historical or cultural significance. 268
Furthermore, Zapatero advocated for women, as seen by his cabinet, half of whose seats
were filled by women. He legalized abortions during the first twelve weeks of a given pregnancy
and created a “fast-track” version of a divorce, shortening the process from two years to ten days.
Zapatero caused further controversy with the first bill that he submitted to Congress, one that
created a harsher sentence on males who domestically abuse women than on the female
perpetrators. In 2006, Zapatero’s Law of Dependency meant to reduce some of the
responsibilities of women in society by providing the state’s help to the disabled and senior
citizens and also aimed to create more jobs for female immigrants. 269 Lastly, the Law for
Equality Between Women and Men, passed in 2007, created new opportunities in the business
and government world for women.
Besides social issues, Zapatero also dealt with ETA during his first administration by
offering to start peace talks with the group if they stopped their terror campaign. 270 Zapatero’s
intent enraged Mariano Rajoy, Aznar’s hand-chosen successor. Rajoy protested the PSOE’s
actions on the streets, an ineffective effort as seen by the decrease in support of the PP during the
June 2005 regional elections. 271 The next year, during March of 2006, ETA agreed to a ceasefire
with Zapatero, which they broke during December of that year by setting off a bomb at the

268

“Spain Remade, Again,” 119.
“Spain Remade, Again,” 118.
270
“Spain’s ‘Second Transition,’” 76.
271
“Spain’s ‘Second Transition,’” 77.
269

Grek 55
Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas Airport (previously knows as the Madrid-Barajas Airport), killing
two people and causing more problems for the Prime Minister and his attempts to negotiate
peace. 272
In 2008, Zapatero won his second consecutive election, legitimizing his first term and
finally forcing the PP to concede to the fact that he has been democratically elected. Taking his
fight for women one step further, Zapatero created the first female-majority cabinet in Europe.
During his second term, Zapatero intended to focus more on foreign policy, especially in
restoring the historic ties that Spain possessed with France and Germany. However, the first
economic recession after fifteen years of growth halted these plans, bringing Spain into a major
crisis, one that is still very present in Spain to this day. 273
What the newly democratic Spain achieved up until this point is remarkable and a result
of its constant efforts from 1975 until 1992 to fully integrate itself into Europe. 274 Within the
space of the year 1992, Spain hosted the World Fair Exposition in Seville and the Summer
Olympic Games in Barcelona, solidifying its presence in the world community. King Juan Carlos
inspired the events with his idea to celebrate Spain’s successful transition into a democracy and
show the world that Spain had caught up to the other developed countries. 275 Despite the fact that
the World Fair succeeded in spotlighting Spain’s newfound modernity, it did not have the longterm economic benefits that Seville had hoped for, ones that would financially support the
city. 276
Unlike the Expo in Seville, the other grand-scale event of that year, the Summer
Olympics, proved to be both a commercial and technological success, structurally and
272

“Spain Remade, Again,” 119.
“Spain Remade, Again,” 123.
274
Kelly, 34.
275
“1992,” 62.
276
“1992,” 63.
273

Grek 56
demographically transforming Barcelona as a city. 277 Keeping in mind Catalonia’s sensitive
position towards its status of a nationality instead of a nation, the King and Queen of Spain
entered the Opening Ceremony to the Catalonian anthem instead of the Spanish one in order to
appease the regionalist sentiments of the Autonomous Community and maintain a peaceful
relationship with Madrid. 278 By the conclusion of these two events, the Spanish politicians
announced that their country was now caught up with the rest of Europe, and thus its
modernization efforts came to an end: 279 The only Europeanizing that Spain did after 1992 was
the monetary integration. 280
With the end of its campaign for international advancement, Madrid focused its efforts on
transforming its own image within the country. When the Partido Popular took over the
government in 1996, the state-sponsored media changed. The television channels, for example,
displayed more programming about the monarchy, the church, and other more traditional
elements of Spain. 281 In 1998, the wedding of Eugenia Martínez de Irujo, the daughter of the
Duchess of Alba, and Fran Rivera, a famous bullfighter from a family dynasty of bullfighters,
became a huge televised event. The press constantly referred to the event as a depiction of the
“real Spain,” generating a nationalistic tone and pegging its identity to one characteristic in a
comparable manner to Franco’s adoption of the Andalucían culture. 282
The Deputy Prime Minister Francisco Alvarez Cascos also created a greater sense of
nationalism when he announced that fútbol (or soccer) would be elevated and glorified in Spain
as the pride and favorite pastime of the nation. This move, just like the televised wedding,

277

“1992,” 63.
“1992,” 64.
279
Kelly, 34.
280
Moreiras Menor, 134.
281
Kelly, 35.
282
Kelly, 36.
278

Grek 57
resembled Franco’s policies because of its use of Spanish stereotypes to an extent that even the
advertisements on the official television sponsor of the team depicted the players in a
bullfight. 283 The push for nationalism that Cascos caused reached such an extreme degree that it
prompted people to act negatively towards some of the specific regions, as seen during the 1998
World Cup when the commentators blamed the Basque players for the national team’s poor
performance. 284 Unfortunately, the media’s misrepresentation of the Basque Country did not end
here, but was also used in political coverage as well.
During the late 1990’s, the national news stopped covering some of the major events in
Spain, especially the ones dealing with the Basque Country, despite the fact that the mass media
was present. The actions of the government and the media here can be seen as an example of
“information self-censorship” and intervention of the government, revealing the way that the
mass media dealt with information policies. On January 20, 1998, more than 600 people,
including high-ranking government officials, attended the “Event for a Dialogued Peace in the
Basque Country,” yet no national channel or newspapers reported on it. There seemed to be an
information blackout. 285 Nearly two months later on March 26, 1998, despite filming the event,
the national television stations yet again did not broadcast the events in Madrid, this time a press
conference on the signing of the Madrid Manifesto, but the Basque channels did. Finally, on
October 20, 1998, the Spanish public national channel TVE1 reported on the Madrid Forum for
Peace, and on December 2, 1998, all of the television stations covered the signing of the Lizarra
Declaration. According the Madrid Forum, the change in the mass media’s actions in regards to
affairs in the Basque Country was a result of the media not wanting to cover any of the
negotiation or peace process until ETA declared a ceasefire, which it formally did with the
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Lizarra Declaration. The lesson learned from the reporting of the mass media on these issues is
that it seemed as if the government was meddling in the media in order to convert political issues
into policy matters, especially when it dealt with the specific regions and their quest for more
power. 286
Meanwhile, apart form the governmental policy issues, the youth generation had its own
problems. More young people than ever began to attended university, but no new jobs opened
up, forcing the unemployed graduates to live with their parents. This phenomenon made housing
more expensive, which prompted the authorities in Madrid to create subsidized, low-cost housing
for the youth. 287 The worsening economy also affected the music industry because record
companies had to turn away the smaller individualized groups that dominated la movida
madrileña in order to put more effort into producing pop music that could earn a bigger profit. 288
Other artists, such as Alaska, Miguel Bosé, and Radio Futura, had to change their sound to
become more commercial, something that would never have happened during the previous
decade, Spain’s “Golden Age of Music.” 289
One band that began its career during la movida and continued to produce music past its
end was Hombres G, a rock group that created a craze in Spain (especially in the female
adolescent demographic) similar to the one that the Beatles created in Great Britain and the
United States. When la movida ended, Hombres G successfully continued their careers because
of their established popularity in Spain as well as other Spanish-speaking countries, mainly in
Mexico and Venezuela. The extreme level of success they experienced allowed them to pursue
other commercial ventures, such as starring in their own movies and writing books, both of
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which furthered their fame. By the time their fifth album Voy a pasármelo bien debuted in 1989,
the group had lost their punk-influenced roots of la movida. The single “Voy a pasármelo bien”
reached the top of the charts later that year and contained a much more mature sound with more
melodic vocals that was reminiscent of the Spanish rock of the late 1970’s. 290
Another change in the Spanish musical scene was a decrease in domestic music
production and an increase in international music heard in the country. The global advances in
technology have created a new way to share music, instantly connecting artists and listeners
through the internet, and further develop particular genres. The dominating style that originated
in the Mediterranean city of Valencia and continued being made in Spain was a new type based
on new foreign influences, such as techno and house, called bakalao. 291 According to Gianni
Ginesi, bakalao “was a route towards increasingly richer sonorous territories with synthetic
elements, repetitive and mechanical rhythms, all emanating the volume levels on a par with those
of rock concerts.” 292 Here, for the first time in Spanish music, the songs were mixed by DJ’s and
not recorded by specific artists. For the Spanish youth, going to parties on the weekends
represented their real life and allowed them to distance themselves from their responsibilities and
commitments. Excesses defined the new way of partying (and therefore living), as seen in the
upswing of drug use, especially ecstasy. 293
An encompassing song of the bakalao movement is DJ Chimo Bayo’s 1991 single “Así
me gusta a mí.” The Valencia native achieved great domestic and international success with this
single and it became one of the bakalao movement’s bestselling hits of all time in Spain, 294 sort
of an anthem of the time. The music itself resembles the pop-synth of la movida, but with a
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quicker beat in order to encourage dance; the song’s intention is to be played in an enormous
club with flashing lights and crowded spaces, the typical bakalao venue. The song’s few and
repeating lines glorify ecstasy (“Si la conoces / te gustará / porque es la bomba / que va a
estallar / no tiene pegas / porque es genial), 295 discuss the direct ties between dancing, partying,
drugs, and positive feelings. 296 This style of partying inspired by the bakalao movement became
a Spanish phenomenon and defined its identity, but extreme nationalist groups also linked
themselves to this image and used it to develop Francoist ideas. Eventually, the larger society
started to realize what was happening with the youth and began to declare many elements of the
bakalao lifestyle criminal activity, ending this subculture in 1997. 297
In other music scenes of the time, artists began to incorporate traditional Spanish music
styles, such as the guitar-infused flamenco, into their music. While some of these bands, such as
Ketama, formed in the 1980’s, they did not achieve wide-scale fame until the mid 1990’s, around
the time that the country under the Partido Popular underwent a spell of nationalism. Perhaps it
was some of the feelings that brought back certain Francoist traditions, such as the importance of
the national fútbol team, or glorified the “real Spain” on national television, which encouraged
one of the genres that Franco had promoted. Ketama’s uniqueness lies not in their lyrics, but in
their ability to modernize flamenco by fusing it with other genres of music, such as jazz or pop,
and adding a varied instrumentation. Not all approved of the new flamenco, but enough fans,
especially young ones, did that Ketama produced several number one hits, such as 1995’s “Flor
de lis” and 1997’s “Estatua de sal.” 298
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Additionally, from the end of the 1990’s and through the next decade, Spain experienced
a resurgence of music festivals, many of which were dominated by international acts. A large
portion of the domestic acts that performed had heavy international influences, singing in
English rather than Spanish, unlike the artists of la movida the decade before, and started calling
themselves “indies.” 299 The biggest of these festivals, Sónar Festival, began in Barcelona in 1994
and grew in size and popularity every year 300 and is still held in the same city to this day. 301
Sónar Festival became a model for other festivals, a cross between a rock concert and a rave, and
embraced the idea of experimentation in electronic music. The significance of the festival
movement lies in the way that it helped diversify the club scene by encouraging them to start
using sub-genres of electronic dance music, not just the bakalao. 302
At the beginning of the new century, one of Spain’s artists finally broke through on the
international stage in a way which none had ever done before: In 2001, Alejandro Sanz became
the first Spanish artist to record an MTV Unplugged album, an acoustic album for the Americanbased music channel. 303 The Madrid native first recorded music in the early 1990’s, and it was
not until he released his fifth album, Más, did his fame skyrocket. Más is now one of the
bestselling albums in all of Spanish music history. There is more relevance, however, to his
Unplugged album because he was the first artist in its 12-year history to join the international
powerhouse of albums. The song that reached the top of the Spanish charts, “Y solo se me ocurre
amarte,” is a love song with flamenco-inspired guitar lines that compliment the singer’s raspy
voice, again sounding reminiscent of what Franco attempted to make Spain’s “sound.” To this
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day, Sanz continuously achieves success and is the Spanish artist with the most Grammy awards,
17 Latin Grammys and three American Grammys. 304
During this time of Spain’s music sounding more diversified and gaining more
recognition, some of the artists performed songs relating to the social issues in the country, such
as the recent influx of immigrants and the government’s struggle to deal with them. Chambao, a
band from Andalucía, whose music is described as flamenco-electronic, recorded the song
“Papeles mojados” in 2007. This song tells the story of the millions of migrants, who attempt to
cross the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco into Spain. In an attempt for a brighter future, these
people may lose their documents (if they had any) or their lives. The government may continue
to debate policy, but little is being done about the injustices in Spain. 305
Modern Spanish music is now defined by the interconnectedness of the world:
Everything music-related has become global, such as MTV, CDs, and the internet, so that now
the Spanish youth is barely distinguishable from the young generation in other countries. 306
Furthermore, the current generation’s use of these new resources, especially social media like
Facebook and websites like Youtube, has changed the character and transmission of music across
the world by connecting people on different continents and allowing them to directly share the
music which they are currently listening. So much of the produced and distributed music is now
digital which has allowed music to spread at an even faster rate than before. Finally, the
internationally most-listened to songs are not being produced from just one country, but come
from all over the world, including the Americas and the rest of Europe. 307 Top 40 music lists are
remarkably similar from country to country, and there exists a circuit of nightclubs around the
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world that shares the same style of music, so that no matter what capital a person is in, he can
hear the same music and experience the same atmosphere as Barcelona, Paris, or Berlin. 308 Thus,
fewer and fewer Spanish-produced songs are found at the top of the Spanish top 40 charts, truly
signifying that Spain is indeed fully immersed in the world, the dream of the leaders of the
transition.
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Conclusion

The story of the changing Spanish government from 1936 to 2008 as told by popular
domestically produced music teaches a lesson about the Spanish people and their search for an
identity. Music forms a person’s sense of self because it shapes every stage of his development,
providing idols to admire, mottos to live by, and an outlet for self-expression. Therefore, one can
argue that music has the ability to affect a country in the same way: music can impact a country’s
growth and supply idols to imitate, mantras to uphold, and a way to voice a collective opinion.
Spain’s case is unique because during the forty years that Franco possessed full control of the
country, the dictator desperately wanted to unify his country under one set of values and
traditions, an unnatural imposition on his constituents. Ironically, after his death, the country
came together and created a new culture on its own, resulting from the dramatic increase in
freedoms in Spain. The new Spanish way continued to mature through the development of the
democracy into an international lifestyle that reflects the government’s attempt to fit in with the
top nations around the world.
From 1936 until 1975, the time of the Franco regime, the changes in popular music
mirrored those in the government. During the first ten years of the dictatorship, the generalísimo
attempted to establish Spain’s identity as a country, creating new laws and traditions. Franco
elected to adopt the image of southern Spain as an archetype for all of Spain, fabricating an
illusion that the entire country listened to coplas, danced flamenco, and attended bullfights.
During this era, the Caudillo experienced the least amount of open opposition, which translated
into the least amount of protest music because the artists were either supportive of their ruler’s
vision or scared of the consequences that came with defying his will.
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The outward sense of peace slowly deteriorated when, beginning in the 1950’s, Franco
realized that his country could not survive in its isolated position and sought foreign support in
order to avoid an economic collapse. This moment marked the first introduction of international
influences in Spain, for example through the new tourism industry, which is evident in the
variation in the popular music. Simultaneously, groups of Spaniards started to oppose Franco,
organizing underground and attempting to bring back their local traditions, such as Joan Manuel
Serrat’s attempt to perform for Spain in the Eurovision competition in the banned language
Catalan.
After Francisco Franco’s death on November 20, 1975, the government underwent a twopart transition to a democracy. While this was a drastic change compared to the dictatorship, it
cannot be considered a revolution because there was no dramatic, violent overthrow of the
previous system. In fact, many of the officials under Franco orchestrated the conversion. The
Spanish music also evolved, undergoing changes in the themes of the songs before a radical shift
in its sound. Even la movida madrileña contained various stages of development, from rock to
punk to electronic dance music, instead of jumping from copla to bakalao.
The significance of the transition period is that it gave the Spaniards many new liberties
that they had been deprived of during the forty years under Franco, and not all knew how react.
For the first time, many taboo topics and practices could be openly discussed, which explains
why the content of the songs switched from nationalistic feelings to supporting self-indulgent
behaviors, such as drugs, sex, and alcohol. This period in Spanish history proves that unlike
Franco’s belief, popular culture thrives when there is less control. By the mid 1970’s, the people
of Spain had begun to openly resist Franco’s enforced traditions and values and only came
together and enjoyed common interests when they were able to develop them by themselves.
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Moving forward, Spain’s interconnectedness with the rest of the world defines the
modern Spanish democracy: All of Spain’s actions affect the international community, and other
countries’ decisions impact Spain as well. As of 1992, the country is considered to be a
contender in the world of global superpowers. With the help of the internet, radio, and television
channels such as MTV, the youth are hardly different from those around the developed world.
For example, they listen to the same top songs and have adopted an international popular culture.
Some domestically produced songs to still rise to the top of the Spanish charts, but most tend to
sound similar to those produced in other countries.
The greatest shock that comes from examining the evolution of popular music, and
therefore popular culture, in Spain, however, is not how distinct it is of that during Franco’s
regime but how similar it is. During the last twenty years, the popular artists have brought back
traditional musical trends, such as flamenco guitars, and strayed away from the punk sounds of
the early phases of la movida madrileña. The return to past tendencies can be attributed to
nationalistic sentiments of some of the more recent governing parties, promoting what is the
“real Spain,” as if what came about during la movida was not uniquely Spanish. It is wrong to
discredit something that is so vital to the formation of the modern Spanish identity as “not
Spanish,” just how it was wrong for Franco to abolish regional languages: The regions are
innately Spanish and contribute greatly to the diversity and distinctiveness of Spain. Thus, it
seems as if all have not learned lessons from the past.
Even more striking than the changes in the music is Spain’s image abroad: Thanks to
Francisco Franco, to this day Spain is still seen as the land of siestas, flamenco, and bulls. One
step into any given tourist shop across Spain, whether it is in León, La Coruña, Valencia, or
Seville opens a world of red and white polka dotted flamenco-inspired aprons, key chains in the
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shape of bulls, or t-shirts with siesta-inspired slogans. It is evident that Franco’s work to create
the singular image for his country turned into his legacy, and that almost forty years after his
death it remains prominent. Perhaps over time Spain’s image, just how its music did, will be able
to outgrow the simple stereotypes and match the international power that it has become.
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